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The ﬁeld of personality psychology offers a wealth of robust empirical research and a successful descrip-
tive taxonomy, but neither explains the origins of the structure of human personality nor elaborates a
generative framework for predicting the speciﬁc conditions that evoke the development of distinct
personality traits. Exploration of traditional personality constructs within an evolutionary adaptive indi-
vidual differences framework may help ﬁll this explanatory gap. Personality traits exhibit functional fea-
tures and patterns of variation expected from psychological adaptations designed to solve survival- and
reproduction-related challenges recurrently faced during our species’ evolutionary history. Condition-
dependent evolutionary models of personality have been proposed for decades, but only recently have
begun to see empirical investigation. These models posit that species-typical psychological mechanisms
take as input cues from the individual’s phenotype that would have been ancestrally linked to differential
cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs of alternative personality strategies, and produce as output personality trait levels
with the greatest probabilistic net beneﬁt for the individual. This paper elaborates a more nuanced con-
ceptual framework that builds on earlier conceptualizations of condition-dependent traits to yield new
and untested hypotheses about personality trait variation and covariation. It then describes clear future
research directions for empirically investigating these readily testable hypotheses.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
At present, the ﬁeld of personality psychology offers a wealth of
robust empirical research and a successful descriptive taxonomy,
but does not answer why personality differences take on the
structure that they do, or elaborate a generative framework for
predicting the speciﬁc conditions that evoke the development of
distinct personality trait levels. An adaptationist evolutionary psy-
chological approach, which proposes that many human behaviors,
cognitions, and emotions are the output of psychological mecha-
nisms designed to solve distinct adaptive problems (Buss, 1995),
may offer a cogent predictive framework for identifying the causal
processes responsible for the development of personality traits and
the social contexts that activate them.
Within an adaptive individual differences framework, different
personality traits can be conceptualized as functional strategies
that help solve speciﬁc problems recurrently faced by members
of a species during its evolution (Buss, 2009). In the study of
humans, this adaptationist perspective is generally applied usinga ‘‘top-down’’ approach (Buss, 1995). First, the researcher identiﬁes
a speciﬁc challenge to survival or reproduction in ancestral
environments. Second, the researcher articulates the behaviors
that would have helped solve this adaptive problem, as well as
the cognitive processes and emotions that would have motivated
these behaviors. The researcher then conducts empirical tests for
evidence of these hypothesized, functionally specialized cognitive,
affective, and behavioral design features.
Personality psychology has historically operated outside of
such an a priori predictive theoretical framework, focusing more
on the statistical structure of individual differences than on the
potential evolutionary functional origins of those differences
(Buss, 1987, 1990, 1991a,b, 1996a,b, 1999; Buss, Larsen, Westen,
& Semmelroth, 1992).
Recent work (e.g., Kanazawa, 2011; Penke, Denissen, & Miller,
2007; Verweij et al., 2012) has explored multiple potential evolu-
tionary models for individual differences in personality. However,
theorists have largely overlooked the possibility that species-typi-
cal psychological adaptations produce individual differences in
personality, instead favoring models that assume more direct
gene? personality effects. Given the relative neglect of the power-
ful, but under-utilized tool of condition-dependent adaptations,
this paper places a particular focus on adaptive individual
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costs and beneﬁts of alternative personality traits.
1.1. The beneﬁts and costs of personality traits
Although personality and evolutionary psychology have tradi-
tionally had different foci of empirical inquiry, an exploration of
the evolutionary functionality of the Five-Factor Model (FFM,
Costa & McCrae, 1985), one of the most widely validated models
of human personality and whose dimensions are exhibited in a
diverse array of non-human animal species (see Gosling & John,
1999; Nettle, 2006; Smith & Blumstein, 2008), illustrates how an
adaptationist conceptual framework may be fruitfully applied to
the study of human individual differences. The high pole of extra-
version in humans, for example, may be conceptualized as an
interpersonal strategy that can increase mating opportunities
(MacDonald, 2006). High levels of extraversion could lead to
increased mating opportunities both directly by engaging potential
mates and indirectly by leading to the formation of friendships and
social alliances that facilitate increases in status and ascension in
the social hierarchy (Denissen & Penke, 2008; Nettle, 2005,
2006). Data from non-human animals offer evidence consistent
with this hypothesized function of extraversion; bold behavior by
Trinidadian guppies (Godin & Dugatkin, 1996), zebra ﬁnches
(Schuett & Dall, 2009), and collared ﬂycatchers (Garamszegi,
Eens, & Török, 2008) is associated with increased mating success.
A hypothesized function of high agreeableness is that it facilitates
successful collective action by leading individuals to deeply engage
in and focus on cooperation to achieve group goals (Denissen &
Penke, 2008), an interpersonal orientation that is also invaluable
in a long-term mate. Indeed, in some nonhuman species, signals
of non-aggressive strategies appear to increase individuals’ desir-
ability as long-term mates (see Ophir & Galef, 2003; Ophir,
Persaud, & Galef, 2005). High levels of conscientiousness are
hypothesized to promote successful pursuit of long-term goals
such as good health and longevity by means of determination,
self-discipline, and delayed gratiﬁcation (Denissen & Penke,
2008; Nettle, 2006), and the creative problem-solving capacities
exhibited by individuals high in openness to experience may lead
to enhanced status and increased mating opportunities (Haselton
& Miller, 2006; Lewis, Al-Shawaf, & Yilmaz, 2014).
Even high levels of neuroticism, a personality trait that has
historically been framed exclusively as ‘‘maladaptive’’ (Grant,
2011, p. 42), may at least partly reﬂect the output of evolved
psychological mechanisms. Several theorists have proposed that
humans possess evolved psychological mechanisms designed to
elevate neuroticism levels as a functional response to the threat
of social exclusion (Denissen & Penke, 2008; Nettle, 2005, 2006).
Higher levels of neuroticism are associated with endogenously dri-
ven attentional shifts (Flehmig, Steinborn, Langner, & Westhoff,
2007), which may guide attention toward negative social outcomes
such as relationship exclusion or dissolution. Such selective
attention to potential threat cues (Gallagher, 1990; Hemenover &
Dienstbier, 1996) and focusing on negative information
(Hemenover, 2001) may result in greater sensitivity to potential
negative social outcomes (Grant, 2011; Kuppens & Van Mechelen,
2007), as well as greater worry and anxiety in response to potential
relationship threats. In turn, these cognitive and affective states
may motivate behaviors such as vigilance and guarding of one’s
relationship partners to protect limited relationship opportunities
(Denissen & Penke, 2008; Nettle, 2005, 2006).
The key idea is that traditional personality constructs are not
only amenable to exploration within an adaptive individual
differences framework, but also exhibit characteristics expected
of psychological adaptations designed to solve ﬁtness-relevant
problems recurrent in human ancestral environments.Although a given strategy on a particular personality dimension
may serve reproductive beneﬁt-linked functions, each strategy also
carries potential costs. In non-human species, exploratory or bold
behavior may increases risk of predation (guppies: Dugatkin,
1992; Godin & Davis, 1995; theoretical model: Wolf, van Doorn,
Leimar, & Weissing, 2007; for review, see Smith & Blumstein,
2008), and among humans, extraversion can similarly carry ﬁt-
ness-relevant costs – extraverts are disproportionately represented
in hospitals with injury or illness (Nettle, 2005) and their pro-
nounced sensation-seeking can lead to traumatic injury (Field &
O’Keefe, 2004) and legal trouble (Ellis, 1987). Similarly, high levels
of agreeableness can carry ﬁtness costs; individuals who avoid
conﬂict are less desirable as mates in a variety of species, including
humans (e.g., ﬁghting ﬁsh: Doutrelant & McGregor, 2000; Midas
cichlid: Barlow, 1986; humans: Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011), and
high agreeableness may lead individuals to forgo their own objec-
tives and risk social exploitation (Judge, Livingston, & Hurst, 2011).
Although high levels of neuroticism may cognitively and affec-
tively motivate an individual to protect limited social opportuni-
ties, high neuroticism is associated with impaired somatic health
(Cohen & Williamson, 1991; Glaser & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2005;
Herbert & Cohen, 1993; O’Leary, 1990) and can place burdensome
strain on social relationships (e.g., Buss, 1991a; Neeleman, Sytema,
& Wadsworth, 2002). Even high conscientiousness, a trait rarely
regarded as undesirable, may lead individuals to forgo unantici-
pated, but valuable opportunities. Importantly, this includes
opportunities that could dramatically increase reproductive ﬁt-
ness, such as opportunistic short-term mating (Schmitt, 2004).
Although high openness is associated with greater creativity, it is
also associated with social withdrawal, delusional thoughts,
and risk for schizophrenia and related disorders (McCreery &
Claridge, 2002; Nettle, 2009). In short, the pursuit of any given per-
sonality strategy is associated with both potential beneﬁts and
potential costs (Buss, 1990; DeKay & Buss, 1992).1.2. Cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs: individual differences
The beneﬁts of pursuing a given personality strategy depend on
whether an individual faces the adaptive challenge the personality
strategy is designed to help solve, how effective the strategy is in
solving the adaptive problem for that particular individual, and
the beneﬁts that accrue to the individual by successfully solving
the problem (Buss, 2009; Denissen & Penke, 2008; Nettle, 2006;
Penke et al., 2007). The costs of the strategy depend on the poten-
tial costs inherent to the strategy itself (e.g., extraversion-associ-
ated injury risk) and the likelihood of the individual incurring
those costs, as well as the opportunity costs to the individual –
the beneﬁts that the individual would obtain by pursuing an
alternative strategy.
Crucially, these variables inﬂuencing the cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs
of a given personality strategy differ across individuals as a
function of their condition. An organism’s condition refers to its
phenotypic quality (e.g., physical attractiveness, strength, see
Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011), and reﬂects the organism’s ‘‘ability
to efﬁciently convert energy into ﬁtness-enhancing traits and out-
comes’’ (Lukaszewski, Larson, Gildersleeve, Roney, & Haselton,
2014), or ‘‘overall ﬁtness budget’’ (Gangestad, Merriman, &
Thompson, 2010; Tomkins, Radwan, Kotiaho, & Tregenza, 2004).
A condition-dependent evolutionary psychological model posits
that species-typical psychological mechanisms take as input condi-
tion-linked cues predictive of differential costs and beneﬁts of
alternative personality strategies in ancestral conditions, and pro-
duce as output the personality strategy of greater probabilistic net
beneﬁt for the individual, given his or her condition (see Tooby &
Cosmides, 1990 for their seminal theoretical discussion of this
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Considering the condition-dependent costs and beneﬁts of
extraversion helps to illustrate this concept. Extraversion draws
attention to one’s characteristics (Anderson & Shirako, 2008;
Ashton & Lee, 2007; Nettle, 2005), which can advertise one’s posi-
tive attributes, but also initiate competition and provoke conﬂict
with rivals (Lund, Tamnes, Mouestue, Buss, & Vollrath, 2007). The
beneﬁts of broadcasting information about one’s physical charac-
teristics are not uniform across individuals – it is more beneﬁcial
for attractive than unattractive individuals. Similarly, engaging in
potentially conﬂict-initiating social behaviors is more costly for
less physically formidable individuals (McDonald, Navarrete, &
Van Vugt, 2011). Consequently, the net beneﬁts of extraversion
are likely higher for stronger and more attractive individuals
(Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976). If the psychological mecha-
nisms responsible for the introversion–extraversion continuum
calibrate the manifest behavior they produce according to cues
linked to these costs and beneﬁts, then we should expect stronger
and more attractive individuals to exhibit higher levels of extraver-
sion. Indeed, individual differences in attractiveness and strength
are predictive of individual differences in extraversion
(Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011).
Relationships between individuals’ psychological and morpho-
logical attributes have been documented since early in the history
of personality psychology (e.g., Kretschmer, 1931; Sheldon, 1940,
1942). However, without an articulation of the process by which
individuals’ morphological condition and personality are con-
nected, these condition-personality links lack a cogent explanation
– let alone a powerful theoretical tool for predicting which facets of
an individual’s condition should be linked to which personality
dimensions and in which direction.
At ﬁrst blush, the postulation that humans possess species-
typical psychological adaptations that calibrate personality levels
according to an individual’s condition might not immediately
appear to accord with the known stability of individual differences
in personality (Caruso, 2000). However, considering the patterns
that condition-dependent personality mechanisms would be
expected to produce reveals how a condition-dependent model
of personality actually predicts stable individual differences. To
illustrate this point, let us further explore the hypothesis that
species-typical psychological mechanisms calibrate individuals’
neuroticism levels according to the individual’s threat of social
exclusion, which varies at least partly as a function of the individ-
ual’s condition (Denissen & Penke, 2008; Nettle, 2005, 2006).
1.3. Personality stability
Neuroticism’s stability may be at least partially accounted for
by temporally and cross-situationally stable links between individ-
uals’ morphology-based desirability as a relationship partner and
their social exclusion. Throughout the lifespan and across social
domains, individuals who possess a less desirable morphological
phenotype experience less social acceptance – and exhibit higher
levels of neuroticism (Mathes & Kahn, 1975). Less attractive new-
borns are viewed as less intelligent, likeable, and good (Stephan
& Langlois, 1984), and a less attractive child’s transgressions are
both treated as more severe and more likely to be attributed to dis-
positional issues (Dion, 1972). In preschool, less attractive children
are conferred lower social status (Vaughn & Langlois, 1983), and
less attractive and athletic individuals experience more rejection
by their peers in childhood and adolescence (Vannatta, Gartstein,
Zeller, & Noll, 2009). In adulthood, less attractive individuals are
discriminated against as potential mates and experience a more
adverse mating environment (e.g., Buss, 1989; Buss & Barnes,
1986; Waynforth, 2001). This lifelong exclusion of individuals withless desirable morphological proﬁles may at least partly account
for the cross-situational and temporal stability of neuroticism. If
(i) humans possess psychological mechanisms that calibrate
individuals’ neuroticism levels according to cues linked to their
likelihood of being social excluded (Denissen & Penke, 2008),
(ii) individuals’ likelihood of being socially excluded is stably
linked to their desirability as a social partner, and (iii) their desir-
ability as a relationship partner depends – even if only partly – on
their proﬁle of morphological attributes, then we should expect
those individuals with less desirable morphological proﬁles to
exhibit higher neuroticism across time and context. In short, we
should expect species-typical, condition-dependent psychological
adaptations to produce stable individual differences in personality
(see also Buss & Greiling, 1999 for their discussion of ‘‘enduring
situational evocation’’).
Moreover, if this postulation that condition-dependent mecha-
nisms produce stable personality differences as a consequence of
taking as input condition-linked cues that inherently exhibit high
levels of stability (e.g., physical attractiveness, formidability), then
individuals might be able to infer others’ personality trait levels at
above chance levels even at zero acquaintance (e.g., merely by
looking at photograph of the individual). Indeed, there are multiple
extant studies in support of this speculation. Shackelford and
Larsen (1997) photographed participants, took measurements of
participants’ facial symmetry from these photographs, and used
these symmetry assessments to predict participants’ personality
levels. They found a positive association between individuals’ facial
symmetry and extraversion, a ﬁnding that has subsequently been
replicated by Fink, Neave, Manning, and Grammer (2005) and
Pound, Penton-Voak, and Brown (2007), the latter of whom pro-
vided convergent evidence for this ﬁnding by employing a distinct
method. More recently, Holtzman, Augustine, and Senne (2011)
expanded on this research by examining the relationship between
individuals’ facial symmetry (as assessed from static photographs)
and a broader range of personality dimensions. They found signif-
icant associations between facial symmetry and 44 dimensions of
individual differences, ranging from the Big 5 factors to individual
facet levels, and from socially aversive to pro-social traits. Collec-
tively, this group of ﬁndings suggests that individuals’ personality
level may be able to be inferred, with some degree of accuracy,
merely from photographs of the individuals. More broadly, these
ﬁndings are unambiguously consistent with the overarching
proposal that condition-dependent psychological mechanisms
can produce stable individual differences in personality as a conse-
quence of calibrating their output according to stable, condition-
linked variables.1.4. The heritability of personality
The proposal of species-typical personality mechanisms is also
ostensibly inconsistent with the heritability of personality traits
(Penke et al., 2007). The heritability observed in personality traits
would not necessarily be the pattern expected of species-typical
adaptations; selection often leads to zero heritability as a conse-
quence of favoring the genetic variant with the greatest replicative
ﬁtness to the point of the extinction of alternative genetic variants.
Stated differently, directional selection in favor of the highest-
ﬁtness genetic variant reduces variation at that genetic locus until
that allele becomes a virtually universal feature of a species’
genome. By deﬁnition, then, species-typical adaptations should
exhibit virtually zero heritability at the genetic loci involved in the
building of that adaptation.
A number of evolutionary biologists and geneticists have inter-
preted the heritability of manifest personality as evidence for varia-
tion in the genes involved in the construction of the psychological
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Penke et al., 2007).
There are several known polymorphisms associated with indi-
vidual differences in personality. For example, neuroticism is asso-
ciated with the short allele of the DRD4 exon III polymorphism
(Tochigi et al., 2006); the number of CAG repeats at the androgen
receptor (AR) gene in men (Westberg et al., 2009); the serotonin
transporter promoter 5-HTTLPR short allele (Sen, Burmeister, &
Ghosh, 2004); and the GABA(A) Alpha 6 receptor Pro385Ser Pro
allele (Sen et al., 2004). Extraversion is also associated with the
number of CAG repeats at the AR locus (Lukaszewski & Roney,
2011; Westberg et al., 2009).
However, (1) models of personality based on genetic polymor-
phisms leave the lion’s share of inter-individual variation in person-
alityunexplained (e.g., seeWestberget al., 2009), and (2) it is unclear
whether these genetic polymorphisms are associated with differ-
ences in the psychological mechanisms responsible for personality,
or with individual differences in the characteristics that serve as
input cues into personalitymechanisms and thereby inﬂuence their
output.
If the psychological mechanisms that produce personality are
designed to take as input cues associated with differential costs
and beneﬁts of alternative strategies, and at least a subset of these
cues includes heritable, non-personality attributes such as physical
attractiveness and strength (Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011), then we
should expect personality to show heritability in behavioral genet-
ics studies – as the output of species-typical, condition-dependent
mechanisms.
Lukaszewski and Roney’s (2011) discovery of a link between the
AR gene and extraversion illustrates this point clearly. If (i) individ-
uals’ physical attractiveness and strength vary as a function of
alternative genetic variants at the AR gene, (ii) the costs and ben-
eﬁts of extraversion vary as a function of individuals’ physical
attractiveness and strength, and (iii) the humans possess psycho-
logical mechanisms that calibrate manifest extraversion levels as
a function of cues linked to differential costs and beneﬁts of alter-
native strategies on the introversion–extraversion continuum, then
we would expect – on a priori grounds – extraversion to exhibit
heritability – even as the output of universal psychological mech-
anisms (see Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, for their seminal discussion
of this concept of indirect, or ‘‘reactive,’’ heritability).
Recent research asserts that a mutation-selection balancemodel
– but not a condition-dependent model – can account for heritable
variation in personality (Verweij et al., 2012). This research, how-
ever, betrays the misconception that these two models predict dif-
ferent patterns of heritable variation. Verweij et al. (2012)
compare observed patterns of heritable variation to those expected
under three models: balancing selection, selective neutrality, and
mutation-selection balance. Under a balancing selection model,
genetic variation underling personality differences is maintained
by changing selection pressures across environments. For example,
an allele that predisposes individuals to higher levels of neuroticism
couldbe favored in environments inwhich relationship stability and
ﬁdelity are low, but would be outperformed by an allele associated
with lower levels of neuroticism in environments inwhich relation-
ship stability and ﬁdelity are high. However, a condition-dependent
mechanism that calibrated individuals’ neuroticism levels accord-
ing to their desirability as a relationship partner, local levels of rela-
tionship stability and ﬁdelity, or other inputs linked to differential
costs and beneﬁts of neuroticismwould have been favored by selec-
tion over a mechanism insensitive to these cues. Given the known
capacity of selection to craft such condition-dependent mecha-
nisms, it is not highly plausible that heritable variation in personal-
ity can be predominantly explained by balancing selection.
A selective neutrality model, on the other hand, attempts to
account for heritable variation in personality by proposing thatgenetic variants underlying personality differences are unaffected
by selection because they are unrelated to ﬁtness outcomes. How-
ever, given that personality differences are linked to ﬁtness-relevant
variables such as attractiveness (Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011), mat-
ing behavior (Zietsch, Verweij, Bailey, Wright, & Martin, 2010), and
number of offspring produced (Jokela, Kivimaki, Elovainio, &
Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2009), selective neutrality is a rather implau-
sible explanation for genetic variation in personality. It is perhaps
unsurprising, then, that Verweij et al. (2012) conclude that neither
selectiveneutralitynor balancing selection can account for observed
patterns of heritable variation in personality. However, they errone-
ously categorize a condition-dependent model as being subsumed
under selective neutrality, and conclude that extant data are consis-
tent with mutation-selection balance.
This mischaracterization of a condition-dependent model leads
to a critical oversight: the failure to realize that the patterns of
genetic variation expected under a mutation-selection balance
model and a condition-dependent model are identical. A muta-
tion-selection balance model acknowledges that directional selec-
tion favors, among existing genetic variants, the allele associated
with the most optimal trait levels, and eliminates alternative
alleles. Although selection is constantly reducing genetic variation
by purging these lower ﬁtness alleles, this is an iterative process
across generations that is inexorably accompanied by an inﬂux of
mutations that introduce new genetic variation. Verweij et al.
(2012) are not unjustiﬁed in their conclusion that the observed
heritable variation associated with personality is most consistent
with mutation-selection balance. However, they jump to the
unwarranted conclusion that the genetic loci under mutation-
selection balance are speciﬁcally those that code for the mecha-
nisms that produce personality.
An equally plausible alternative is that the loci under mutation-
selection balance are those that code for the traits that serve as
inputs to personality-producing mechanisms. Both of these per-
spectives represent mutation-selection balance models, so are thus
equally consistent with extant data. However, the latter view is a
condition-dependent model – a condition-dependent model is a
mutation-selection balance model.
To illustrate this important point, let us consider polymorphism
at the AR locus. Different alleles at the AR locus are associated with
individual differences in attractiveness and strength, as well as
individual differences in extraversion. If the AR gene is directly
involved in the building of psychological mechanisms that cali-
brate extraversion levels, then we would not necessarily expect
morphological correlates downstream from the gene, such as
attractiveness and strength, to exhibit links to extraversion inde-
pendent of the gene itself. Alternatively, if humans possess psycho-
logical adaptations designed to calibrate extraversion levels
according to condition-based cues like attractiveness and strength,
then we would expect links between these input cues and the out-
put of these mechanisms. Strongly consistent with this condition-
dependent model, individual differences in attractiveness and
strength predict extraversion levels – above and beyond genetic
polymorphism (Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011). This relationship
between genetics, physical attractiveness, strength, and extraver-
sion offers a clear empirical example of how species-typical, condi-
tion-dependent psychological mechanisms can produce heritable
personality outcomes.
In sum, a condition-dependent model of personality proposes
that if psychological mechanisms calibrate manifest personality
trait levels according to condition-linked inputs such as physical
attractiveness and strength, and these attributes exhibit heritabil-
ity in behavioral genetic studies, then patterns of heritable
variation in personality may actually reﬂect heritable variation in
these inputs, rather than in the psychological mechanisms
sensitive to those inputs.
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First, there is no strong reason to believe that a single model must
account for all heritable variation in personality. Human personal-
ity exhibits heritable variance on manifold dimensions. There may
be different evolutionary origins for variance on each of these
dimensions, and within each dimension, different models may
account for distinct proportions of variance. Evidence suggesting
an important role of mutation-selection balance in the evolution
of human personality is not tantamount to evidence of an absence
of other selective and non-selective forces at work.
Second, because a mutation-selection balance model and a
condition-dependent model predict identical patterns of heritable
variation, no pattern of heritable variation in personality could
adjudicate between a mutation-selection balance model and a
condition-dependent model. Instead, demonstrating functional
design of the psychological mechanisms that produce personality
differences ultimately will be necessary to discriminate between
these alternatives. Testing for this discriminative evidence repre-
sents a key future research direction for an evolutionary approach
to personality, as discussed in greater detail below.
2. The future of evolutionary personality psychology
2.1. Experimental studies
The correlational nature of research that has tested evolved
condition-dependent models of personality (e.g., Lukaszewski,
2013) renders such research unable to establish the causal direc-
tion of observed condition-personality links. Establishing whether
there is a causal direction from condition-linked input to manifest
personality output is necessary for adjudicating between the muta-
tion-selection and condition-dependent alternatives. To more
directly test the hypothesis that humans possess psychological
adaptations designed to calibrate personality trait levels according
to cues linked to the adaptive problems that distinct personality
strategies were designed to solve, a combination of experimental
and longitudinal designs is needed.
Here, I outline a general experimental framework by which a
condition-dependent model could be tested. The overall hypothe-
sis of species-typical, evolved condition-dependent mechanisms
is that they should output different personality trait levels as a
function of individual differences in cues ancestrally linked to the
probability of facing the adaptive challenges that alternative per-
sonality strategies were designed to solve. In natural settings, con-
dition-linked differences in the frequency and/or strength at which
a relevant adaptive problem is faced should result in the hypothe-
sized personality mechanisms producing individual differences in
trait levels. Correlational studies (e.g., Lukaszewski, 2013) have
shown precisely this pattern.
However, in contexts or environments that present unambigu-
ous cues indicating that the relevant adaptive challenge is not
being faced, the mechanisms responsible for producing the person-
ality strategy that evolved to help solve that challenge should be
deactivated, regardless of the individual’s condition. In response
to unambiguous cues that the relevant adaptive challenge is being
faced, such unequivocal evidence should activate the personality
strategy in all individuals, irrespective of their condition. On the
other hand, under conditions of uncertainty – like those that char-
acterize the vast majority of natural settings – manifest personality
trait levels should track individuals’ condition (e.g., on dimensions
such as physical attractiveness and formidability, Lukaszewski &
Roney, 2011) because these condition-linked cues would have
been statistically associated with facing the relevant adaptive
challenge in ancestral conditions.
An unpublished dissertation by Lewis (2013) testing the
hypothesis that evolved psychological mechanisms calibrateindividuals’ neuroticism levels as a condition-dependent response
to social exclusion (Denissen & Penke, 2008; Nettle, 2005, 2006)
provides evidence consistent with this series of hypotheses.
Exactly as would be expected if humans universally possess
evolved, neuroticism-calibrating adaptations that ‘‘lie dormant
until they are activated by cues signaling that [the] adaptive prob-
lem is being confronted’’ (Buss & Shackelford, 1997), Lewis found
that individuals’ exhibited lower levels of manifest neuroticism
when their inclusion in social relationships was certain, regardless
of their condition. Comparatively, individuals exhibited increased
manifest neuroticism in response to situations indicating certain
exclusion, irrespective of their condition. However, under condi-
tions in which social cues were insufﬁcient for participants to
ascertain their social status with absolute certainty – a constraint
that would have characterized the vast majority of ancestral condi-
tions – individuals’ neuroticism levels adaptively varied as a
function of their condition.
Collectively, these ﬁndings and the evolutionary model moti-
vating their discovery concurrently highlight (1) the ‘‘power of
the situation’’ to create ‘‘potent forces producing or constraining
behavior’’ (quoting Ross & Nisbett, 1991, p. 9, but see Tooby &
Cosmides, 1990), and (2) the importance of individual differences
and the person (Funder & Colvin, 1991; Ozer, 1985; Roberts,
Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). This nuanced nature of
human psychology, which resonates with and brings together core
assertions from social and personality psychology, highlights the
heuristic value and unifying potential of an fully interactionist
evolutionary theoretical framework.2.2. Evolved psychological mechanisms and the input power of the
situation and person
The situation-mediated links between condition and personal-
ity described by Lewis (2013) highlight the predictive power of
an evolutionary theoretical framework across the false boundaries
that have historically separated personality and social psychology.
This highlights not only that an evolutionary perspective can offer
a unifying meta-theoretical framework for these sub-disciplines,
but also that they must be integrated to achieve a mature under-
standing of human psychology.
These condition-situation-personality links may also inform an
understanding of the information-processing structure of evolved
psychological mechanisms. For an exemplary illustration of the
information-processing structure of an evolved psychological
mechanism, let us examine Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides’
‘‘kinship estimator’’ (2003, 2007).
Lieberman and colleagues postulate that psychological adapta-
tions to identify and direct altruism toward kin are designed to
take as input cues recurrently linked to genetic relatedness in
ancestral environments (Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2003,
2007). This kinship-estimating mechanism takes multiple cues
(e.g., observing a newborn nursing from one’s own mother,
Lieberman et al., 2003, 2007; facial resemblance, Lewis, 2011) as
input; hierarchically treats them according to (a) their ancestral
predictive validity (i.e., their correlations with actual genetic relat-
edness) and (b) the presence or absence of more valid cues; and
calibrates the outputs of kin-directed altruism and anti-incestuous
sentiment according to this interaction of cues (Lewis, 2011;
Lieberman et al., 2003, 2007).
Generalizing these conjectures, selection would have favored
mechanisms that were designed to (i) take multiple cues as input,
(ii) hierarchically treat those cues, prioritizing those that would
have greater predictive validity, and (iii) produce emotional and
behavioral solutions to the adaptive problem indicated by available
cues.
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of the information-processing structure of evolved psychological
mechanisms, including personality–calibrating mechanisms.
Unequivocal indicators of an adaptive problem inherently would
have been the most valid cues that that adaptive problem was
being faced. An individual’s condition, even if recurrently statisti-
cally linked to facing a particular adaptive problem, would have
been a less valid cue (e.g., see Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Given the
greater predictive validity of unequivocal social cues, the postu-
lated personality–calibrating mechanisms would be expected to
adjust their output according to such cues when they were avail-
able, but to calibrate their output according to the cues linked to
the individual’s condition when such unequivocal cues were
unavailable. As expected, Lewis (2013) found that when unambig-
uous indicators of the relevant adaptive problem were present,
individuals’ manifest personality trait levels were calibrated
according to these cues (and less valid, condition-based cues had
no effect). However, when such unequivocal cues were absent,
individual’s personality trait levels were calibrated according to
condition-based cues.
These ﬁndings direct focus on the information-processing struc-
ture of these mechanisms – an important facet of human psychol-
ogy that, to date, has been relatively neglected by research
informed by an evolutionary psychological framework. In its young
history, evolutionary psychology has produced a robust body of
novel ﬁndings about ancestral adaptive problems and the psycho-
logical output (e.g., emotions, behaviors) that could have helped
solve these problems. However, substantially less direct attention
has been given to the information-processing architecture of these
mechanisms responsible for these manifest psychological phenom-
ena. This gap is not trivial; the psychological and behavioral output
of these mechanisms – our psychology – depends not on the cues
to the adaptive problem per se, but rather on the evolved algo-
rithms with which the mechanisms process these cues. For evolu-
tionary psychological research to be most consistent with its
conceptual foundations, greater explicit attention should be direc-
ted toward the information-processing algorithms of humans’
psychological adaptations. Focusing on the design features of psy-
chological adaptations at all three levels of information-processing
– input cues, information-processing algorithm, and manifest psy-
chological output –will be key to gleaning the full range of insight
that an evolutionary psychological approach can offer to personal-
ity psychology, and to psychology as a whole.
To offer a more complete investigation into humans’ psycholog-
ical adaptations – including the postulated mechanisms responsi-
ble for calibrating personality levels – future research should be
characterized by a balanced emphasis on these three distinct, but
interrelated foci. First, research should identify the speciﬁc cues
(e.g., social, phenotypic) that would have been recurrently linked
to facing a particular adaptive problem (and thus the cost–beneﬁt
tradeoffs of alternative personality strategies), as these cues repre-
sent likely candidates to serve as inputs into evolved personality–
calibrating mechanisms (Buss, 1991b; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
Second, it is key that future research explicitly articulates the
hypothesized information-processing structure of the posited
mechanisms, including the mechanisms’ computational
(‘‘decision-making’’) procedures. Understanding the mechanisms’
information-processing design features will be indispensable to
explaining and predicting the mechanisms’ output – human
personality.
2.3. Common calibration and personality trait covariation
By these systematic means, a condition-dependent model of
personality may be able to offer new theoretical and empirical
insight into personality variation and personality covariation. If(a) humans possess evolved psychological mechanisms that
calibrate personality levels according to condition-linked cues
ancestrally associated with differential cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs of
alternative personality strategies, and (b) the cost–beneﬁt trade-
offs of multiple personality traits were linked to an individual’s
condition, then individual differences in condition should lead to
individual differences on multiple personality dimensions simulta-
neously (Lukaszewski, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
Indeed, recent research has shown that trait covariation is
substantially reduced after controlling for cues hypothesized to
have radiating inﬂuences on multiple personality dimensions
(Lukaszewski, 2013). This at least tentatively suggests that
different dimensions of personality covary as a consequence of
‘‘common calibration’’ based on these shared input cues (Buss,
2009; Dall, Houston, & McNamara, 2004; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
A key issue remaining to be addressed is whether these trait
intercorrelations reﬂect the output of a single mechanism that
simultaneously calibrates multiple dimensions of personality traits
(for a sophisticated evolutionary discussion of trait covariation
traceable to life history strategy, see Figueredo et al., 2005; see also
Digman, 1997; McCrae & Costa, 2008; Rushton & Irwing, 2008;
Funder, 2001), or are due to the calibration of multiple distinct per-
sonality mechanisms by shared input cues. To empirically adjudi-
cate between these competing hypotheses, future research
should test their divergent predictions. To identify the predictions
that the multiple mechanism perspective yields, it is helpful to
consider why these mechanisms would be expected to take as
input the particular cues that they do: because those cues would
have been recurrently linked to speciﬁc adaptive problems in
ancestral environments. Under the multiple mechanism view, we
might expect multiple mechanisms to have shared input cues
because those cues were recurrently linked to the distinct adaptive
problems that each of the mechanisms was designed to solve. For
example, if neuroticism and extraversion evolved to help individu-
als deal with the threat of relationship exclusion and secure mating
opportunities, respectively, and individuals’ mate value was linked
to both of these adaptive problems, then we would expect mate
value to exert common calibrational effects on both of these per-
sonality dimensions. However, for those cues that (a) were recur-
rently linked to an adaptive problem that one personality
strategy (e.g., high Openness) evolved to solve, but (b) were
unlinked to the adaptive problem a different strategy (e.g., high
Agreeableness) evolved to solve, we should expect calibration of
the former trait, but not of the latter. That is, cues to an adaptive
problem that one personality strategy was designed to solve but
whose solution was ancestrally unrelated to individual differences
on another personality dimension, should result in calibration of
the former personality trait, but not the output of mechanisms
responsible for calibrating individual differences on personality
dimensions.
Future research should thus (1) articulate the adaptive prob-
lems each personality strategy is hypothesized to be designed to
solve; (2) identify phenotypic, social, or other cues that should
have been recurrently linked to those adaptive problems; and (3)
distinguish between those cues that would have been linked to
multiple adaptive problems and those that would have been dis-
criminatively indicative of an adaptive problem whose successful
solution would have been associated with a particular strategy
on one, but not other, personality dimensions. Research should
then design studies to examine whether exposure to cues linked
to multiple adaptive problems is associated with trait inter-
correlations, whereas exposure to cues indicative of a speciﬁc
adaptive problem is associated with individual differences in the
relevant personality dimension but not others. Such future research
should help discriminate between the single trait factor and multi-
ple mechanism hypotheses and further advance our understanding
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ences in personality.
2.4. Longitudinal studies: changes in cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs during the
lifespan
Relative to correlational studies, experimental studies can more
discriminatively test a condition-dependent model by virtue of
demonstrating a causal relationship between input cues and man-
ifest personality output. However, single-session experimental
studies are inherently limited in that they can only test for ‘‘snap-
shot’’ shifts in personality levels. Cross-sectional, experiment-
based data are thus unable to speak directly to whether personality
mechanisms calibrate individuals’ ‘‘trait’’ levels across the lifespan
in response to changes in condition (e.g., physical attractiveness,
formidability), social circumstances, or other phenotypic or envi-
ronmental conditions (see Buss & Penke, 2014). Experimentally
induced changes in adults’ manifest personality levels (see Lewis,
2013) are consistent with the proposal that personality-producing
mechanisms can recalibrate their output, but cannot conclusively
demonstrate that changes in the costs and beneﬁts of alternative
personality strategies across the lifespan are associated with
‘‘trait’’-level shifts. Given the known temporal stability of personal-
ity traits, longitudinal research assessing changes in personality
over time will be necessary for testing the heuristic value of a con-
dition-dependent model for personality psychology.
Longitudinal designs are also an important research direction
for answering another interesting theoretical but empirically unex-
plored issue: when during development or the lifespan the mecha-
nisms responsible for producing personality calibrate their output
(Duckworth, 2010). The timing of personality calibration during the
lifespan may itself reﬂect a design feature of the mechanisms that
produce personality. On one hand, ancestrally, adolescence could
have been a critical period for the ‘‘crystallization’’ of personality
strategies, since performance at that life stage would have been a
strong predictor of future performance. On the other hand, individ-
uals may experience signiﬁcant changes in condition across the
lifespan due to, for example, the development or deterioration of
formidable physical characteristics; the formation or dissolution
of valuable social alliances; or disease, illness, or injury. Because
these changes would have been associated with shifts in the
cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs of alternative personality strategies, there
would have been costs associated with ‘‘crystallizing’’ a personality
strategy too ﬁrmly. For example, an extraverted personality strat-
egy may be associated with many beneﬁts and relatively few costs
for men who are high in physical attractiveness and formidability
(Lukaszewski & Roney, 2011). Ceteris paribus, these men would
have been both desirable to women as mates (e.g., Buss, 1989;
Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsenmeier, 2002; Li
& Kenrick, 2006), and able to successfully vie for status against
intrasexual competitors, including when this competition involved
physical conﬂict. However, if such a high mate value man were to
suffer from an injury or illness that decreased his physical formida-
bility or attractiveness, the probabilistic costs of an extraverted
strategy would increase, and the beneﬁts would decrease. Con-
versely, if some men experienced increases in mate value later in
life, such as via the death of higher ranking males within their
group or other forms of social hierarchy restructuring that con-
ferred newfound status on these men, then selection would have
favored mechanisms that enabled these men to capitalize on their
newly elevated status by shifting their extraversion and other per-
sonality trait levels (see Buss, 2000, for a discussion of critical
events that may recalibrate personality trait levels).
Even in the absence of mate value changes – or in spite of them
– shifts in life stages also change the cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs of per-
sonality strategies. For example, as older adults move away fromdirect reproductive effort, the ﬁtness beneﬁts associated with neu-
roticism’s hypothesized anti-inﬁdelity functions decrease (see
Lewis, 2013). That is, in spite of older adults’ mate value decreasing
with age – a change that may be associated with greater threat of
one’s mate’s inﬁdelity during direct reproductive stages of adult-
hood – the net beneﬁts of neuroticismmay decrease as older adults
age. Consistent with the proposition that humans’ possess person-
ality–calibrating mechanisms that are sensitive to developmental
stages that shift the cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs of alternative strategies,
women’s neuroticism decreases with age (Srivastava, John,
Gosling, & Potter, 2003) – even though their reproductive value
decreases (Daly & Wilson, 1983).
In sum, the countervailing costs and beneﬁts of personality
crystallization and personality ﬂexibility (Dall et al., 2004; Sih,
Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 2004; Tufto, 2000) may have led to the
evolution of mechanisms that crystallize individuals’ personality
trait levels within a certain range based on input during delimited
periods of life (Buss, 2009; Dall et al., 2004; Tooby & Cosmides,
1990), but also produce adaptive local shifts from these baseline
levels as the cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs of alternative personality strat-
egies change across the lifespan.
A key focus of a future research agenda should be longitudinal
designs that track within-individual changes in the phenotypic
characteristics or social environments hypothesized to serve as
input into personality–calibrating mechanisms. Assessing the
relationship between these changes and shifts in individuals’ levels
of personality ‘‘traits’’ will enable more direct testing of the
hypothesis that personality mechanisms both crystallize individu-
als’ ‘‘traits’’ to some degree and later calibrate them according to
phenotypic, social, or other environmental changes that shift the
cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs of different personality strategies.3. Conclusions
This paper outlines the theoretical insight that the evolutionary
psychological heuristic of condition-dependent adaptations may
offer to the study of personality and individual differences. Extant
research (e.g., Lewis, 2013; Lukaszewski, 2013; Lukaszewski &
Roney, 2011; Simmons & Roney, 2011) offers promising initial
empirical demonstrations of the value of this theoretical tool.
However, it is the continued and reﬁned application of this frame-
work that will reveal its true value for personality psychology.
Three future directions are of particular importance on a research
agenda for applying this theoretical tool to the study of individual
differences.
First, future research should more explicitly investigate the
information-processing design features of the psychological mecha-
nisms responsible for producing personality. First, researchers
should identify condition-linked, social, and other environmental
cues associated with the likelihood or frequency at which ancestral
humans faced ﬁtness-relevant adaptive challenges. This simulta-
neous identiﬁcation of both condition-based and social cues will
lead to novel, theoretically anchored a priori hypotheses about
important social and individual inﬂuences – and their interaction
– on human psychology. Second, researchers should identify the
predictive validities of these cues in indicating the presence of
the adaptive challenge, because this may shed valuable insight
on the computational architecture of the mechanism’s decision-
making procedures; selection would have favored mechanisms
that hierarchically treated distinct social and individual-based cues
and prioritized the most strongly predictive cues.
These two steps will guide, in a theoretically anchored manner,
a particular focus toward the relatively neglected information-
processing stage of the mechanism’s decision rule, and help
offer a more comprehensive perspective on our evolved
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cally principled steps may yield novel, a priori predictions that lead
to the discovery of facets of social and personality psychology that
otherwise might be left uncovered.
Second, future research should discriminate between two
classes of cues: those that would have been ancestrally linked to
differential cost–beneﬁt tradeoffs on multiple personality dimen-
sions, and those that would have been uniquely linked to a partic-
ular adaptive problem that a speciﬁc personality strategy was
designed to solve. This distinction will be important, because the
evolutionary heuristic of condition-dependent adaptations yields
divergent predictions about the patterns of personality variation
expected to result from calibration to these different classes of
cues. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst class of cues would be expected to
calibrate multiple personality dimensions simultaneously and
result in trait covariation, whereas the second class would be
expected to exert calibrational effects on individual dimensions
of personality independent of other dimensions.
Third, longitudinal studies should systematically investigate
shifts in personality ‘‘trait’’ levels across the lifespan as a function
of changes in phenotypic, social, or other cues ancestrally linked to
important adaptive problems. These ideas represent important
steps toward the development of a deeper and more sophisticated
explanatory framework for personality variation and covariation.
At present, the ﬁeld of personality psychology is characterized
by a wealth of robust empirical research and a successful descrip-
tive taxonomy. However, researchers have yet to uncover an
answer to the fundamental question of why human personality is
structured this way. The particular evolutionary psychological
approach outlined here – that of condition-dependent mechanisms
– may help move toward a more comprehensive understanding of
the origins of personality variation, and thus holds promise as a
predictive and explanatory framework for enriching research on
human personality. It is my hope that the continued development,
reﬁnement, and application of this framework will contribute to
the increasing sophistication and progress of personality
psychology.
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